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COMMENTS
SHARED RIGHTS TO SOURCE CODE:
THE COPYRIGHT DILEMMA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two hundred years copyright law in the Unit-
ed States has changed dramatically to meet the demands of
creative and technological development.' Yet, copyright law
has continued to reflect the intent of the framers of the Con-
stitution, who gave Congress the power "to promote the prog-
ress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."' In the last twenty-five years, with
the rapid growth of computer technology, this constitutional
mandate has become increasingly difficult to fulfill and has
necessitated many changes in copyright law through congres-
sional legislation and judicial interpretation.'
One area of intellectual property protection that has
* @1992 by Alexandra J. Horne. The author wishes to thank June Carbone,
Jeffrey Steinhardt, and Joel Uinzner for their helpful suggestions, and especially
her husband, Joe, for his encouragement, patience and unflagging sense of humor.
1. Copyright law is defined as "a system of property rights for certain kinds
of intangible products, generally called works of authorship." MARSHALL LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1989). It developed in 18th century England
to give authors the exclusive right to make copies of their books, and thus, refers
to the right to make copies. Id. Today, copyright protection is much broader,
covering most. artistic, literary, and musical works, as well as computer software.
Id. See infra notes 24-62 and accompanying text.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Following the American Revolution, the
thirteen colonies, with the exception of Delaware, passed laws protecting authors;
but because these laws only applied within the boundaries of each state, problems
arose that required a uniform national law. The result was Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution. Id. at 4-5.
3. See infra notes 24-153 and accompanying text.
4. Intellectual property law concerns the protection of property rights to in-
formation. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 14. For example, copyright protects expres-
sive information, patent protects technological information, and trademark protects
symbolic information. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 14. Although these three forms of
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been particularly challenging is the protection of the rights to
computer software.' Software copyright is an area that devel-
oped very rapidly and often did not fit comfortably with earlier
copyright law.' In fact, it was unclear whether software could
be protected by copyright until 1980 when the Copyright Act
of 1976 was amended, following the recommendations of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
righted Works (CONTU).7
Copyright protection of source code' and object code9
has been an especially troublesome area of software protec-
tion," as has the protection of application and operating sys-
protection are based on different theories and statutes, they often overlap and in-
terrelate, due to the nature of the rights and the fact that the federal government
administers much of intellectual property law, with the exception of trade secret
protection, which is governed by state law. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 14. See infra
notes 225-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of trade secret and patent
protection.
5. Software tells the computer how to accomplish functions that produce a
specific result or perform a task, such as screen displays for a video game, col-
umns in an accounting program spreadsheet, or "spell check" in a word process-
ing program. Id. at 66. "Software is the instructions to the computer." ALAN
FREEDMAN, THE COMPUTER GLOSSARY 636 (1989). A series of instructions that
performs a specific task is called a software program or a program. Id. The Copy-
right Act of 1976 defines a computer program (software) as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
6. See infra note 64.
7. Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)). The idea of creating
CONTU began in the 1960's, but the Commission was not established until 1974
with the passage of an amendment to the Copyright Act. Pub. L. No. 93-573 §
201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974). Tide II of that amendment stated that the
purpose of CONTU was to study the "use of copyrighted works of author-
ship . . . in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, and transferring information . . . and the creation of new works by the
application or intervention of such automatic systems . . . ." Id. at 1873. The
Commission was directed to make recommendations "as to such changes in copy-
right law or procedures that may be necessary to assure for such purposes access
to copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright own-
ers." Id. at 1873-74. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
8. Source code is a "high level" programming language, such as BASIC,
FORTRAN, or PASCAL, that uses English symbols and is understandable to a
human. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 66.
9. Object code is the machine executable instructions created by a compiler
or assembler from source code. BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, QuE's COMPUTER USER'S
DIcTIONARY 324 (1990).
10. Most litigation concerning the copyrightability of computer programs does
not involve source code. ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 170
(1989). This is because source code is not physically incorporated into the com-
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tem programs," and the literal and nonliteral elements of a
computer program.'" The protection of the rights to comput-
er source code is of particular concern to a software developer,
because to be economically viable, a software developer must
be able to develop and sell software, but retain the rights to
portions of the source code. Otherwise, the developer would
have to create new subroutines" each time new application
software is developed."
A conflict as to ownership of source code can arise when a
software publisher, for whom a software package has been de-
veloped, claims exclusive rights to the entire software package
through a licensing agreement and subsequent copyright pro-
tection." This exclusivity would preclude reuse of the source
code by the developer and require starting from scratch each
time a new software package is developed for a different
publisher. 6 Clearly this control over the software rights would
puter circuitry or onto the diskettes, and is not the version that is distributed to
the public. Id. In fact, because object code is very difficult for a human to inter-
pret, it is the form that is usually deposited for registration with the Copyright
Office. Id. Consequently, infringers of computer programs generally do not have
access to the source code, and thus, object code, rather than source code, is more
likely to be the subject matter of copyright litigation. Id.
11. Application programs and system programs are software programs. An
application program performs specific tasks for the computer user, such as word
processing or bookkeeping. An operating system program, on the other hand, is
transparent to the user and performs internal computer functions or facilitates the
use of an application program. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983).
12. The literal elements are the actual computer code, such as the source
code or object code. The nonliteral elements encompass the computer program's
structure, sequence and organization. Id. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (3d Cir. 1986).
13. A subroutine or "library routine" is a generic routine that accomplishes
basic computer functions. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc.,
Copyright L Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
14. A software developer would most likely insist on the retention of the
rights to library routines, because they are the foundational tools used for all sub-
sequent development. A library routine is "a 'pre-packaged' module of code which
accomplishes a standard computer function and which has been previously devel-
oped and tested; a 'library routine' can be plugged into a new program without
the programmer having to 'reinvent the wheel' each time a basic computer func-
tion is required." Id. at 1-2.
15. See supr notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
16. Historically, a copyright was indivisible, allowing only one owner of a
copyright at a time. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 323. However, the 1976 Act
contains "the first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of
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have a severe economic impact on the developer, which, in
turn, would be passed on to the public in the form of higher
prices and fewer products: results that could conflict with the
constitutional mandate to benefit society.'7 Conversely, if the
software developer retains the rights to the source code, not
only does the developer receive an economic incentive to con-
tinue exploration of new technological innovations, but the
benefits are shared by the publisher and the user in the form
of product variety, efficiency and price.
This comment addresses the issue of shared rights to
source code, focusing on copyright protection as the preferred
method of protection." Beginning with section II, the com-
ment sets the stage with a history of copyright law in the Unit-
ed States and how it has been adapted and amended over the
years to accommodate the evolving needs of the computer
industry and the constantly changing age of high technology.
This section also discusses a number of cases that laid the
groundwork for later developments in this field.' Section III
explores the problem of shared rights to source code in the
context of a recent dispute in the Ninth Circuit," and section
IV analyzes the problem in terms of established copyright law
and its development, comparing software protection to that of
literary characters.' Finally, section V proposes a practical
solution for copyright protection of source code in today's era
of rapidly developing software.s The proposal suggests an
amendment to copyright law that will strengthen statutory
protection of software and reflect the prevailing custom in the
copyright in our law." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976). Spe-
cifically, section 101 defines a copyright owner "with respect to any one of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). However,
divisibility does not mean that multiple owners can share the rights to portions of
a software package or the underlying source code, as this comment will explain.
Rather, section 101 refers to the divisibility of the rights enumerated in section
106, such as reproduction, derivative works, distribution of copies, or public per-
formance or display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). See Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Soft-
ware, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
17. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
18. Trade secret and patent protection will also be considered as alternative
forms of protection. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 55-153 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 170-234 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32500
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software industry today. Alternatively, the proposal recom-
mends guidelines for the courts to follow when interpreting
existing copyright law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Copyright Protection
Copyright law has been a vital force in the United States
since the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power
to establish copyright protection.' In response to this man-
date, and to protect the needs of the arts and sciences in a
developing nation, Congress passed the first Copyright Act on
May 31, 1790. Although there is no legislative history for the
Act, it is clear that Congress used the British Statute of Anne
as its guide. 6 The Copyright Act of 1790 protected the rights
of an author to any book, map or chart for a term of fourteen
years, renewable for an additional fourteen years. 7
Between 1790 and 1909, when the Copyright Act was
revised," Congress addressed the developments in technology
and the arts by gradually adding more subjects that could be
protected by copyright. For example, in 1802, prints were add-
ed;" in 1831, musical compositions;s during the Civil War,
photographs;"' and in 1870, paintings, drawings, and sculp-
ture.32
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Because this clause was adopted in final
form without debate in a secret proceeding on September 5, 1787, little is known
about what the framers had in mind or the scope of the language itself.
25. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
26. 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710). The Statute of Anne was passed in England in
1710. It was the first law to recognize the rights of authors and has been used
throughout the western world as an example for copyright law.
.27. 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)).
28. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1988)).29. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
30. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
31. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (1865) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
32. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 212 (1870) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
1992]
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1. 1909 Copyright Act
In 1909, the Copyright Act was revised pursuant to a 1905
request by President Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted to make
the law more compatible with the times." This new Act of
1909 expanded copyrightable subject matter to cover "all the
writings of an author."' In addition, it increased the duration
of copyright to an original term of 28 years and a renewal
term of twenty-eight years, doubling the length of possible
copyright protection." This Act remained in effect for
sixty-seven years until Congress completely overhauled it with
the Copyright Act of 1976.'
2. 1976 Copyright Act
In the intervening years, from 1909 to 1976, additions to
copyrightable subject matter addressed changes in technology,
such as the invention of motion pictures"' and sound record-
ings." It was not until 1955, however, that Congress finally
authorized funding for a study by the Copyright Office to de-
termine how best to meet the needs and anticipate the diffi-
culties that a new, revised copyright act would raise." In re-
sponse, the Copyright Office prepared a number of reports re-
garding the potential problems in any major revision of the
law and made recommendations as to how best to revise the
law.'
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1-216 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 5.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
35. Id. § 24 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)).
36. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17,
U.S.C.. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
37. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 37 Stat. 488 (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)). Note that motion pictures were first protected as pho-
tographs. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 1 COPYRIGHT 166 n.13 (1989). See Edison v. Lubin,
122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903).
38. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (current version at
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
39. Legislative Appropriation Act, 1956, ch. 568, 69 Stat. 499, 517 (1955).
The main impetus for revision was to make American copyright law more compat-
ible with foreign copyright protection. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.
40. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
[Vol. 32
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These recommendations were given to Congress in
1961.' Many years of Senate and House hearings followed"2
until finally, the current Copyright Act was passed in 1976.7
The new law made numerous changes to existing copyright
law. It established a single federal system of copyright protec-
tion and expressly preempted state common law." It also pro-
vided protection for "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."" Copyrightable subject matter was again expanded to
include seven broad categories: literary works; musical works;
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictori-
al, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; and sound recordings.46 Additionally, the
41. Id.
42. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660-63 for a discussion of the congressional bills, revisions,
and convoluted legislative history of this Act.
43. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)). See Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act
of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856 (1978).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). Section 301(a) provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.
I. § 301(a). Section 301(b) specifies exceptions to this rule, such as subject matter
that does not come under copyright protection, any cause of action that began
prior to January 1, 1978, and activities that violate legal or equitable rights that
are not within the general scope of copyright. I& § 301(b). Section 301(c) con-
cerns sound recordings, id. § 301(c), and section 301(d) states that "[n]othing in
this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal statute."
Id. § 301(d).
45. I& § 102(a). Note that this section overrules an early Supreme Court
decision that a player piano roll did not qualify for copyright protection because
it was not in a form intelligible to a human. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). Today, sound recordings, computer programs, and
motion pictures are examples of works that cannot be read without the aid of a
machine or device, and yet, are copyrightable. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 32.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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Act simplified the duration of copyright protection to a term
equal to the life of the author plus fifty years. 7
3. CONTU Recommendations
Although the Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated many
changes, it did not address protection of computer technology,
delegating that question to the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) for reso-
lution. 8 While Congress awaited CONTU's recommendations,
section 117 of the Act, entitled "Limitations on exclusive
rights: Computer programs," left protection of computer pro-
grams as it had been under the 1909 Copyright Act. This sec-
tion provided the owner of a copyright with no "greater or
lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction
with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retriev-
ing, or transferring information."49
With the establishment of CONTU in 1976, the age of
computers and copyright protection finally came into focus.
CONTU's charter directed it to make recommendations to
Congress concerning how copyright law could best address
these new challenges.' CONTU released its final report on
July 31, 1978, with the following recommendations regarding
47. Id. § 302(a). Protection for joint works is for a term of the life of the
last surviving author plus 50 years. Id. § 302(b) (1988). Protection for anonymous
works, pseudononymous works or works for hire is for a term of 75 years from
the date of first publication or 100 years from the year of creation, whichever ex-
pires first. Id. § 302(c).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
49. Id. Section 117 in the 1976 Copyright Act specified in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a
work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving or transferring information, or in conjunction with any
similar device, machine, or process than those afforded to works un-
der the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a
state, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and con-
strued by a court in an action brought under this title.
Id.
50. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974).
Congress was concerned with "the impact of [copyright] on the use of copyrighted
materials in computers and other forms of information storage and retrieval sys-





The new copyright law should be amended 1) to make it
explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they
embody an author's original creation, are proper subject
matter of copyright; 2) to apply to all computer uses of
copyrighted programs by the deletion of the present Sec-
tion 117; and 3) to assure that rightful possessors of copies
of computer programs can use or adapt these copies for
their use."
Congress adopted these recommendations on December
12, 1980, with an amendment to the Copyright Act.
5 2 Specifi-
cally, section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act was revised to
include a definition of computer programs as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." 3 In addi-
tion, section 117, which concerned the limitations to exclusive
rights with regard to computer programs, was revised to incor-
porate CONTU's recommendations.'
B. - Copyright Protection of Computer Software
Today, computers are an integral part of personal and
business life, because they are able to perform complex calcula-
tions many times faster than the human brain. To perform
these functions, the computer uses a software program. A
computer software program is developed by a human being
(known as a computer programmer) using source code. Al-
though source code is understandable to a human, it is not
intelligible to a computer. Therefore, in a simplified case, a
two-step process is used to translate the source code into a
machine-readable, binary language of ones and zeros.' In the
51. COMMISsION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(CONTU), FINAL REPORT 2 (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
52. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (cod-
ified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)).
53. Id. § 10(a).
54. I This section deals explicitly with situations in which copies or adapta-
tions of computer programs are not an infringement. Id. Specifically, a copy or
adaptation can be made if it is an "essential step in the utilization of the com-
puter program" or if it is used for archival purposes. Id.
55. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 161. See supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
56. Binary language is a series of ones and zeros, representing electrical
50519921
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first step, a computer program, called a compiler, 7 translates
the source code into an intermediate language. Next, a second
computer program, an assembler,' translates the intermedi-
ate language into object code, a binary machine language that
the computer understands and can execute directly." This
final version is stored in the computer's memory in the central
processing unit (CPU) or on floppy diskettes,' where it can
be accessed by the computer user."'
Although the Copyright Office registered the first comput-
er program in 1964,6' the passage of the Act of December 12,
1980 gave the judiciary a solid foundation on which to base
decisions concerning the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams. One of the first cases to interpret this new legislation,
and a landmark decision concerning copyright protection of
computer software, was Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer
Corp.1
charges, or the lack thereof, that send instructions to the computer. LATMAN ET
AL., supra note 10, at 170. A machine-readable language or "machine language" is
the language used by the computer to communicate internally. ARTHUR J.
MEADOWS ET AL., DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 155(1987). It is "the computer's native language" and "the only language the comput-
er understands." FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 354.
57. A compiler translates a "high level" language, such as BASIC, COBOL,
FORTRAN, or PASCAL, into machine-readable code. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note
56, at 116; PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 9, at 105.
58. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 33.
59. A machine-readable language or "machine language" is a "very explicit set
of instructions" that the computer is able to understand and execute. ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE & ENGINEERING 1385 (A. Ralston & E.D. Reilly, Jr.
eds. 1983).
60. A "floppy" is "an auxiliary memory device consisting of a flexible magnet-
ic disk resembling a phonograph record, which can be inserted into the computer
and from which data or instructions can be read." Apple Computer v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983).
61. The above information was put into perspective in a telephone interview
with Roger Romano, Director of Training & Quality Assurance, Metaware, Santa
Cruz, Cal. (Feb. 10, 1991) and a personal interview with Anthony Murabito,
Blakely, Sokoloff, Taylor & Zafman, Sunnyvale, Cal. (Feb. 14, 1991).
62. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 64. In 1964, the Copyright Office began to
accept registration of computer programs under its "rule of doubt," but required
that the deposit be in a form that a human could read (e.g., a printout) if the
program had been published in a form that only a machine could read. LEAFFER,
supm note 1, at 64 n.25.
63. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
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1. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp.
In 1983, when Apple v. Franklin was decided, the question
of copyright protection of computer software was very unset-
tled." In fact, the district court, in denying Apple's motion
for a preliminary injunction, stated that it had "some doubt as
to the copyrightability of the [computer] programs"' in gen-
eral. However, in reversing the lower court's decision, the ap-
pellate court noted that "[its] legal ruling [was] fundamental to
all future proceedings in this action, and... ha[d] consider-
able significance to the computer services industry.""6
Apple Computer was and is a leader in the field of per-
sonal computers and related software; Franklin, a much small-
er competitor.67 From the start of the case, Franklin admitted
that it had copied Apple's operating system program in order
to manufacture a computer that was compatible to an Apple
computer, but defended its copying because "it was not feasi-
ble for Franklin to write its. own operating system pro-
grams."" Franklin's vice president of engineering testified
64. One of the problems with copyrightability of software and computer pro-
grams was that they have a different "look and feel" from traditional forms of
copyrightable subject matter. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 65. Even members of
CONTU had doubts, arguing that other forms of copyrightable subject matter
communicate with people, while computer programs are "essentially mechanical,
labor-saving devices, which transmit electronic impulses to operate machines called
computers." LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 65. (quoting Dissent of Commissioner Her-
shey, FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 27-28).
65. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 812
(1982). Throughout the trial the district court referred to the "'complexity of the
question'" and the "'baffling' problem at issue." Id. at 822-24.
66. 714 F.2d at 1242. Apple originally filed suit against Franklin in 1982, al-
leging that Franklin was liable not only for copyright infringement of 14 computer
programs, but for patent infringement, unfair competition and misappropriation,
as well. Franklin responded to the charge of copyright infringement with the affir-
mative defense that the computer programs did not contain copyrightable subject
matter and made a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the copyright re
gistrations were invalid and unenforceable. Following discovery, Apple moved for a
preliminary injunction, which the lower court denied, resulting in this appeal. Id.
at 1244-45.
67. Id. at 1242-43. At the time of the appeal, Apple manufactured Apple II
computers and distributed over 150 software programs. In 1981, it had sold over
400,000 Apple II computers, had approximately 3,000 employees and annual sales
of $335 million. Franklin, on the other hand, manufactured the ACE 100 personal
computer, and at the time of the appeal, had 75 employees and had sold less th
an 1,000 computers. Id.
68. Id. at 1245.
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that he had studied the requirements and concluded that de-
velopment was not feasible, because it was too technically chal-
lenging.' However, he stated that Franklin had only at-
tempted to rewrite one Apple program and admitted that
additional programs probably could have been rewritten, a
premise that was confirmed by Apple's evidence that others
had in fact written Apple-compatible programs."
On appeal, the court addressed three major issues con-
cerning the copyrightabiity of computer programs: (1) wheth-
er a computer program expressed in object code, as distin-
guished from source code, is copyrightable;7' (2) whether a
computer program embedded in Read Only Memory (ROM)'
is copyrightable;3 and (3) whether a computer operating sys-
tem is copyrightable.4
a. Copyrightability of Object Code
The court began its discussion of the copyrightability of
object code with a statement from its decision in Williams Elec-
tronics v. Artic International" that "'the copyrightability of com-
puter programs is firmly established after the 1980 amendment
to the Copyright Act.'"76 In Williams, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that source code, which the defendant
thought copyrightable, should be distinguished from object
code, which the defendant thought was not copyrightable."
Expanding on that holding, the court determined that object
code was copyrightable, even though it must be deciphered by
69. Id. Specifically, David McWherter testified that "there were just too many
entry points in relationship to the number of instructions in the program." Id.
Entry points are used by programmers to "mesh" application programs with oper-
ating system programs, and McWherter determined that identical signals would
have to be used for 100% compatibility. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1246. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
72. Read Only Memory (ROM) is an "internal permanent memory device con-
sisting of a semi-conductor or "chip" which is incorporated into the circuitry of
the computer . . . . Information stored on a ROM can only be read, not erased
or rewritten." 714 F.2d at 1243. In that respect, it is similar to a compact disk,
video disk or phonograph record. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 581.
73. 714 F.2d at 1246. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
74. 714 F.2d at 1246. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
75. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
76. 714 F.2d at 1248 (quoting Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d at 875).
77. 685 F.2d at 876.
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a machine, because the Copyright Act of 1976 extended copy-
right protection to "works in any tangible means of expression
'from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated directly or with the aid of a machine or device.'"" In
addition, the court confirmed that a computer program, in
either object or source code, could be classified as a literary
work for copyright protection."
b. Copyrightability of Computer Program Embedded in
ROM
Secondly, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that ROMs are not copyrightable because they are "utilitarian
objects or machine parts."' Again, citing its recent decision in
Williams, the Apple court stated that the "embodiment of the
expression in ROM devices" establishes fixation and thus, is
copyrightable.'
c. Copyrightability of Operating System Program
Finally, the court turned to what is considered the most
difficult question: the copyrightability of operating system pro-
grams as distinguished from application programs.
82
Franklin's position was that pursuant to section 102(b) of the
1976 Copyright Act, operating system programs were per se
uncopyrightable.' In addition, the defendant argued that, as
78. 714 F.2d at 1248 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)) (emphasis in original).
79. 714 F.2d at 1249. When computer programs are created, the human pro-
grammer uses source code, but for the computer to understand the program, it
must be translated into object code, a binary machine language, which the com-
puter can execute directly. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. Because
object code is very difficult for a human to interpret, and thus, difficult to copy,
it is the form that is usually registered with the Copyright Office and distributed
publicly. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 66.
80. 714 F.2d at 1249.
81. I& (citing Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982)).
82. Application programs generally perform specific tasks for the computer
user, such as word processing or bookkeeping. Operating system programs, on th
e other hand, are transparent to the user and perform internal computer func-
tions or facilitate the use of application programs. 714 F.2d at 1242-43.
83. Section 102(b) distinguishes copyright protection from patent protection,
stating that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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set forth in Baker v. Selden,' an operating system program was
"either a 'process', [sic] 'system', [sic] or 'method of operation'
and hence uncopyrightable."5
The court noted that section 102(b) and Baker v. Selden
both distinguish between patent law, which protects discover-
ies, and copyright law, which protects writings. However,
Franklin's application in this case was erroneous, because Ap-
ple intended to copyright the instructions, rather than the
method for using the instructions.' Additionally, the court
determined that there was no difference between the protec-
tion of instructions for application programs and system pro-
grams, because both tell the computer to perform a specific
operation and should be given the same copyright protection
under section 102(b)."'
The court also disagreed with the lower court's position
that an operating system program was part of a machine, stat-
ing that simply because an operating system program "may be
etched on a ROM does not make the program either, a ma-
chine, part of a machine or its equivalent."" In fact, an oper-
ating system can be removed from the computer if it is resi-
dent on a diskette or tape, and according to CONTU, "should
no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should
be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of
sound reproduction equipment."89
84. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). At issue in Baker v. Seldon was the contention that
the ruled lines and headings used to illustrate the bookkeeping system were part
of the copyrighted book, and therefore, "no one [could] make or use similar
ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on sub-
stantially the same system, without violating the copyright." Id. at 101. The court
disagreed with this position, finding:
The description of the art in the book, though entitled to the
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the
art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the oth-
er is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can
only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters patent.
Id. at 105. Thus, the court concluded that "blank account-books are not the sub-
ject of copyright; and . . . the mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer
upon him the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged
as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book." Id. at 107. See
also infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
85. 714 F.2d at 1250.
86. Id. at 1251.
87. 1d.
88. Id
89. Id. (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 21).
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Franklin argued that because the operating systems were
"purely utilitarian works," they were not copyrightable pursu-
ant to Baker v. Selden.' The court stated that Franklin's inter-
pretation of that decision was too broad and cited the more
recent Supreme Court decision in Mazer v. Stein,' which re-
jected such an expansive view.' As additional support, the
court quoted the CONTU majority: "[T]he words of a pro-
gram... used ultimately in the implementation of a process
should in no way affect their copyrightability,"" and noted
that Congress had adopted CONTU's recommendations almost
verbatim."
The court stated that the strongest argument in support of
the copyrightability of both operating system and application
programs was that the statutory definition of computer pro-
grams did not distinguish between them." Furthermore,
Franklin was unable to cite any case law to support its distinc-
tion between the two types of programs. 6
Finally, Franklin claimed that because only a limited num-
ber of ways existed to achieve compatibility with the Apple
computer, the idea and expression merged, thereby precluding
copyrightability.97 The court rejected this argument, explain-
90. 714 F.2d at 1251 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103).
91. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
92. 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)). In Mazer v.
Stein, a statuette of a Balinese dancer was made into a lamp base, and, in a revo-
lutionary decision, the Supreme Court upheld the copyrightability of works of art
even though the designs were embodied in useful articles. In addition, the Court
stated that the availability of design patent protection, as well as commercial appli-
cation and mass production of the design, did not affect copyrightability. 347 U.S.
at 201.
93. 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 21).
94. 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing 18 CONG. REC. H10767 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Section 101 defines a computer program as "a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." Id. This definition of a computer program
was added to the 1976 Act by the Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517
§ 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
96. 714 F.2d at 1252.
97. Id. at 1252-53. This concept is known as the merger doctrine, which stip
ulates that when the idea and expression "merge," either because there is no oth-
er way to express the idea or because it can only be expressed in a limited num-
ber of ways, the expression is not copyrightable. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). In other words, when the expression merges
with the idea it is not copyrightable because the idea and expression are one and
1992]
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ing that if there were other ways to express an idea, there was
no merger." Thus, the court rejected Franklin's argument
that operating system programs were per se uncopyrightable
and reversed the lower court's decision, stating that it could
find nothing from either Congress or CONTU that distin-
guished between the copyrightability of an operating system
program and an application program."
Clearly, this decision established the copyrightability of
computer programs and created a solid foundation for future
questions of copyright protection and infringement,1" such
as Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory. o'
2. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory
In 1986, in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
the Third Circuit extended copyrightability to nonliteral ele-
ments'" of a computer program. At issue was whether "the
structure (or sequence and organization) of a computer pro-
gram [was] protectible by copyright, or whether the protection
of the copyright law extends only as far as the literal computer
code."'" Noting that Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer
Corp."° had established that both source code and object
code (the literal elements of the program) were copyrightable,
the Whelan court discussed the protection of the nonliteral ele-
ments or structure of the program, beginning with an analysis
of Baker v. Selden.' 5
Baker v. Selden is the seminal case for distinguishing be-
tween an idea, which is not protectible under copyright law,
the same, and by statutory definition, ideas are not copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1988).
98. 714 F.2d at 1252-53 (citing Freedman v. Grolier Enters., 179 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 20).
99. 714 F.2d at 1252.
100. LEAFR, supra note 1, at 69.
101. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
102. The nonliteral elements encompass the program's structure, sequence and
organization. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir.
1986).
103. Id. at 1224. The literal coding is the source code or object code. Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
104. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra notes 75-99 and accompanying
text.
105. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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and an expression, which is protectible.' ° In Baker, the Su-
preme Court determined that blank forms, which were an
indispensable part of Baker's accounting method, were part of
the idea, and thus, not copyrightable." 7 "In other words, the
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be a part of the expression of the idea."""
In Whelan, the court determined that the structure of the
program was part of the expression, not the idea." The
court based its decision on the fact that the CONTU Final
Report indicated that the Commission intended copyright
protection to extend beyond the literal code,"' and, more im-
portantly, that copyright protection beyond the literal code to
the structure and the logic would provide the "proper incen-
tive" to the computer programmer."' The court noted that
coding is a relatively small part of programming in comparison
to the amount of effort that must be put into the overall devel-
opment of a computer program."' In fact, it is much more
expensive and difficult to develop the structure and logic of
the program, including debugging, documentation and logic,
than it is to do the actual coding."' Thus, to protect the high
cost of program development, the court determined that copy-
right protection should extend beyond the literal code and
encompass the program's structure, sequence and organiza-
tion.1
4
106. 797 F.2d at 1234. See supra note 84.
107. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
108. 797 F.2d at 1236.
109. Id. Since this comment first went to the publisher, the Second Circuit has
criticized this position as an "extremely broad view of copyrightability for a com-
puter program," using "what now seems to be a simplistic test for similarity be-
tween computer programs" that is both "inadequate and inaccurate." Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1991).
110. Id. at 1241 (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 21). The Report
stated that "the separation of idea from form of expression .. . is better realized
through the courts exercising their judgment in particular cases [than by a per se
rule] . . . . Flow charts, source codes, and object codes are works of authorship
in which copyright subsists." Id. (emphasis omitted). Source code and object code
are examples of the literal elements of a computer program, and the program's
structure, sequence and organization are examples of nonliteral elements. Id. at
1248.
111. 797 F.2d at 1237.
112. Id. at 1231.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1248. But see Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv.,
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Once a court has determined that an expression is copy-
rightable, it must decide whether the copyright has been in-
fringed."' Given the nature of litigation, the defendant gen-
erally does not admit to copying, which would constitute direct
evidence, and the court must rely on circumstantial evidence
for its decision."6 Using a two-part test, the court determines
first, whether the defendant had access to the copied element,
and if so, whether there is substantial similarity between the
plaintiff's product and the
defendant's allegedly infringing product."'
In the first part of the test, after access and similarities
have been shown, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the simi-
larities are sufficient to prove copying."8 To prove these simi-
larities, the plaintiff can use expert testimony to assist the trier
of fact in resolving the issue."9 Once copying has been
shown, the next step is to prove unlawful appropriation or
illicit copying.'" In this second part of the test, expert testi-
mony is not allowed, and the finder of fact must rely solely on
the "ordinary lay hearer." 2'
807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), in which the court did not protect the structure,
sequence and organization of the computer program, finding that the numerous
structural similarities were "compelled" by the nature of the cotton markeL Al-
though this decision appears on the surface to reject Whelan, the preliminary in-
junction may have been denied solely because of an insufficient showing of alter-
native ways to structure the allegedly infringing program. LATMAN ET AL., supra
note 10, at 460.
115. Subject to certain, narrow limitations, section 106 of the Copyright Act
provides the owner of a copyright with the exclusive rights to that work. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Consequently, anyone who violates that right "infringes" the
copyright, and the copyright owner is entitled to institute an action for infringe-
ment. Id. § 501.
116. Note that the defendants' admissions of copying in both Apple Computer
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983), and Lotus Devel-
opment Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990),
are the exceptions, rather than the rule.
117. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). This case concerned a
claim that Cole Porter had infringed a number of the plaintiffs musical composi-
tions. In response to this charge, the court established the bifurcated test for
copyright infringement which is still in general use today. Id. Note that on re-
mand, the court found for the defendant. See Arnstein v. Porter, 158 F.2d 795
(2d Cir. 1946).






In Whelan,'" the district court questioned the use of this
"bifurcated substantial similarity test" when the subject matter
was highly complex and unfamiliar to most lay observers, such
as the structure of computer software programs.' The appel-
late court agreed with the lower court's use of a non-bifurcated
test, stating that when the subject matter of the copyright was
especially complex, the ordinary lay observer test was only mar-
ginally useful and potentially misleading."4
3. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional
Recently, the decision in Whelan was adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International.' This case concerned the copyrightability of
nonliteral elements of expression in the user interface of
Lotus' 1-2-3 computer spread sheet program. 6 As in Whelan,
122. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
123. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. at 1321-22. Note that
in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., the defendant admitted to copy-
ing (debating instead, the copyrightability of Apple's computer program).
Therefore, the court did not need to perform this test. Apple Computer v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra notes 68-70 and ac-
companying text.
124. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir.
1986). The court noted that the ordinary lay observer test, which does not allow
expert testimony, had been developed for cases that involved novels, plays and
paintings, but was of "doubtful value" in cases involving computer programs, due
to the programs' "complexity and unfamiliarity to most members of the public."
Id. at 1232. In addition, the court felt that when the finder of fact was the same
for both steps of the bifurcated test, it would be difficult to "forget" the expert
testimony heard in the first step of the test when making a determination of un-
lawful appropriation in the second step. Id. at 1232-33. In fact, the court deter-
mined that in complex cases, expert testimony was "essential to even the most
fundamental understanding of the objects in question." Id. at 1233.
125. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
126. The plaintiff described the "user interface" as the copyrightable nonliteral
elements of the computer program, such as the menus, the display screens, and
the function key assignments. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990). Note that the court decided two other issues, as
well: (1) whether the defendant's program was an infringing work containing ele-
ments that were substantially similar to the copyrightable elements of Lotus 1-2-3,
and (2) whether the defendant's jurisdictional and equitable defenses had merit.
Id. at 42. The court determined that the defendant did copy the copyrightable
elements of the program, not only because of the defendant's admission, but be-
cause the copying was "so overwhelmingly pervasive as to preclude, as a matter of
law, any assertion of independent creation." Id. at 68. Additionally, the court con-
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structure, sequence and organization of the computer program
were considered, as well as the menu command system. 7
The court first examined whether Congress had extended
copyright protection to the nonliteral elements of computer
programs and, if so, to what extent. 8 After considering the
relevant language of the Copyright Act, the court decided that
"[a]lthough Congress did not include 'computer programs' in
[the] list of examples of 'works of authorship,' [that] computer
programs [fell] squarely within the statutory definition of liter-
ary works."'" The court noted, however, that limitations ap-
ply to copyright protection and "'[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.'"'"
As additional support, the court quoted a congressional
report, which stated that "'[s]ection 102(b) [was] intended...
to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer
is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that
the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are
not within' the scope of copyright law."'' The court there-
fore determined that Congress intended copyright protection
to extend to "original expression embodied in computer pro-
grams," a conclusion consistent with the treatment of
nonliteral elements of expression in literature, musicals, plays
and motion pictures.32
cluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that the defendants were unable
to show that the plaintiff was barred from relief either by laches or equitable
estoppel, ld. at 82-83.
127. A menu command system is a screen display that presents a list of com-
mands with a "moving cursor," which is used to select a particular command,
thereby instructing the computer to perform a specific function. Id. at 63-64.
128. Id. at 46-51.
129. Id. at 49 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). Section 101 defines literary
works as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the mate-
rial objects such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
130. 740 F. Supp. at 49 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
131. 740 F. Supp. at 49 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57,
reYoprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5670, 5670).
132. 740 F. Supp. at 54. The court noted that even though an infringer did
not copy the words or dialogue of a book, play or musical score, the work still
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Next, the court considered the defendant's contention
that the user interface in Lotus 1-2-3 was a useful article and as
such, not entitled to copyright protection.13 The court deter-
mined that simply because the computer program was useful
or functional did not preclude its being copyrightable and
pointed out that one statutory mandate should not "destroy or
absorb" another." Indeed, the court emphasized that any
other position would "deny copyright protection to the most
original and least obvious products of the creative mind" sim-
ply because they were functional, and would result in the mar-
keting of inferior products for fear that the best products
might be too good for copyright protection.' 3
Finally, the court discussed the copyrightability of the
nonliteral elements of the program, using a three-part test: (1)
to identify the idea and distinguish it from its expression; (2)
to determine if the expression was limited to essential ele-
ments of the idea (merger); and (3) to decide if the expression
was a substantial part of the copyrightable work.'" Noting
the "amorphous nature of nonliteral elements of computer
programs,""7 the court decided that some of these elements
were not copyrightable, such as the two-line moving cursor'
and the rotated "L,"' because of the limited number of ways.
that these ideas could be expressed.4 However, the court de-
could infringe if the setting, characters, or plot were copied and resulted in sub-
stantial similarity of expression. Id. at 51 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)). As Judge Learned Hand stated in Nichols,
"the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a. plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations." 45 F.2d at 121.
133. 740 F. Supp. at 52.
134. I. at 57-58. In other words, elements of expression are copyrightable
even though functionality or usefulness cannot be used as the basis for copyright
protection. Id.
135. Id. at 58.
136. Id. at 60-62.
137. I at 46.
138. See supra note 127.
139. An electronic spreadsheet is much the same as a manual spreadsheet, in
that it "presents a blank form on which numerical, statistical, financial or other
data can be assimilated, organized, manipulated and calculated." 740 F. Supp. at
63. According to the court, the spreadsheet screen display representing Lotus'
spreadsheet resembled "an 'L' rotated ninety degrees clockwise with letters across
the top to designate columns, and numbers down the left side to designate rows."
Id.
140. Id. at 65. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the merger doctrine.
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termined that taken as a whole, the program's user interface
was copyrightable, because the menu command structure was
not essential to the idea of an electronic spreadsheet and could
be expressed in many ways.'
4. Digital Communications Associates v. Sofiklone Distributing
Corp.
Currently, the law concerning shared ownership of source
code is unsettled. One of the few federal cases to deal with this
issue is Digital Communications Associates v. Sofiklone Distributing
Corp.' In this 1987 case, the court held that screen displays
could be protected independently from the underlying object
code or source code.' However, since that decision, Con-
gress has determined that copyright protection of a computer
program extends to the screen displays, and that infringement
of either the computer program or the screen display is an in-
fringement of the other.'" Thus, the Copyright Office now
accepts a single registration covering all copyrightable elements
of expression in a computer program,' making it unnec-
essary to copyright the screen displays and the underlying code
separately.
Although it may no longer be necessary to follow the pre-
cedent set in Soflklone, the court's discussion of the
idea/expression dichotomy continues to have impact as a basic
141. 740 F. Supp. at 68. The court relied heavily on Judge Learned Hand's
"Abstraction Test" in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), to distinguish between the idea and expression, although it stated that it
was not necessary (or always even possible) to "completely disentangle" the idea
from its expression. Id. at 60. In Nichols, Judge Hand stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.
45 F.2d at 121.
142. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
143. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
144. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b) (1990). See also 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988).
145. LEAFFR, supra note 1, at 188.89 n.41.
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theme throughout all areas of copyright protection. The court
began its discussion with a statement from Whelan that "'[i]t is
axiomatic that copyright protects only the expression of ideas
and not the ideas themselves. '"" 6 This protection was codi-
fied in 17 U.S.C. 102(b) and "[iun no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea... regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."'47
Congress has discussed this distinction with particular
application to computer programs, because of the concern that
copyright of computer programs should only protect the ex-
pression of the programmers' ideas and not extend to meth-
ods or processes.'48 To that end, one of the purposes of sec-
tion 102(b) was to clarify the distinction between idea and
expression: the programmer's expression was copyrightable,
but the "actual processes or methods embodied in the pro-
gram" were not."
Thus, as Softklone and the previous three decisions demon-
strate, the judiciary has looked favorably on the expansion of
copyright protection for computer software. In Apple v. Frank-
lin, the court extended copyright protection to object code
and operating system programs."' In Whelan, copyrightability
was expanded to cover the nonliteral elements of the comput-
er program,' a decision reaffirmed by Lotus.52 Finally, the
discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy in Softklone em-
phasized one of the most fundamental tenets of copyright law:




Although software is clearly copyrightable, a conflict can
occur when two parties disagree as to its ownership, and unfor-
146. 659 F. Supp. at 457 (citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797
F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986)).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
148. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976).
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 102-24 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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tunately, a licensing agreement does not always answer that
question satisfactorily."5
In Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc.," for example,
Distinctive Software, Inc. (DSI) entered into a licensing agree-
ment to develop software games" with Accolade, Inc., a soft-
ware publisher that sells video games worldwide. 57 According
to Accolade, DSI "expressly agreed that ... Accolade would be
the owner of the copyright for all products, or derivative works
from those products, which were developed by DSI pursuant
to the License Agreement."" In fulfilling this agreement,
DSI developed a number of games for Accolade, including a
very popular driving game: The Duel.
In its complaint, Accolade alleged that it owned the copy-
right to The Duel and that DSI had created and developed a
second driving game that was substantially similar to The Duel
in the use of its underlying source code."w In addition, Acco-
lade alleged that DSI had copied subroutines from The Duel
and that by doing so, DSI had infringed Accolade's copyright
in The Duel." Accolade therefore asked for a preliminary
injunction to prevent any further infringement of its copy-
right.
162
In DSI's response to copyright infringement, DSI agreed
that it had entered into a development contract with Accolade
in October 1987, but stated that during the negotiations lead-
ing up to the contractual agreement, DSI had "insisted that it
retain ownership of its 'library routines' and development
tools." 6 1 In addition, DSI stated that not only was Accolade
154. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunction, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202); Defendant's Memo-
randum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Accolade,
Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (No. 90-20202).
155. Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
156. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
157. Id. at 1.
158. Id. at 4-5.
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
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aware that DSI used these library routines to develop all of its
games, but that it was the custom in the software industry for
the developer to retain the rights to generic source code sub-
routines to be reused in subsequent development efforts.'
DSI proposed that the court interpret the contract "in
accordance with industry custom and practice," arguing that
industry experts confirmed that it was the custom for a soft-
ware developer to retain the rights to the library routines or
functional routines, unless there was explicit language to the
contrary.6' Additionally, DSI claimed that the custom and
practice were so pervasive in the software industry, that "a
judgment granting software publishers a copyright over their
developers' tools and routines could cause the collapse of the
computer game software industry.""
DSI claimed that knowing these facts, Accolade had
agreed to allow DSI to retain the source code as a trade secret,
and had embodied this agreement in the October 1987 con-
tract.67  Therefore, DSI claimed it had not infringed
Accolade's copyright, because the copyright did not apply to
the source code."M Conversely, the plaintiff interpreted the
licensing agreement to expressly provide Accolade with the
"exclusive ownership of a valid copyright to all portions of The
Duel," a fact that Accolade says DSI acknowledged by placing a
notice of Accolade's copyright on all copies of the game.69
nary Injunction at 4, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202). A software developer would
most likely insist on the retention of the rights to its library routines, because
they are the foundational tools used for all subsequent development. A library
routine is "a 'pre-packaged' module of code which accomplishes a standard com-
puter function and which has been previously developed and tested; a 'library
routine' can be plugged into a new program without the programmer having to
'reinvent the wheel' each time the basic computer function is required." Id. at 1-2.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 6-7, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
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IV. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by Accolade, a problem can arise as to the
ownership of the copyright to source code, even though both
parties appear to understand the terms of the agreement at
the time the contract is signed. To protect the rights to the un-
derlying source code library routines, the software developer
should turn to established copyright law, beginning with an
argument used by authors to retain the rights to their charac-
ters in literary works.'7"
A. Protection of Characters
1. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System
At first glance it might seem that a thirty-eight-year-old
case concerning the protection of fictional characters would
have no application to computer program copyrightability; but
in fact, Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System 7'
established an argument that can be used to protect source
code today. In Warner Bros., the plaintiff claimed copyright to
the detective story, "The Maltese Falcon," including its charac-
ters and their names. Subsequently, the author, Dashiel
Hammett, reused the characters from "The Maltese Falcon" in
new stories that were broadcast by Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) as the "Adventures of Sam Spade," prompting
Warner Brothers to sue for copyright infringement.'
In its decision, the court first addressed the construction
of the contract, noting that the use of characters and their
names had not been explicitly mentioned in the contractual
agreement assigning the rights to the "Maltese Falcon" to
Warner Brothers.'" Quoting Philipp v. Jerome H. Remick &
Co.," the court stated that any doubt as to ownership should
be resolved in favor of the author and that the "'clearest lan-
170. Computer programs have been copyrighted as literary works, pursuant to
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Therefore, the arguments protecting characters in literary
works are easily applied to computer programs.
171. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
172. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
173. Id. at 949.
174. 145 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
[Vol. 32
SOURCE CODE
guage is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his la-
bor. Such language is lacking here. '""'7 Because the characters
were not even mentioned in the agreement, the court deter-
mined that neither the rights to the characters nor their names
had been granted to Warner Brothers.'76
The court found historical as well as current support for
its decision in the tradition that detective writers carried for-
ward the leading characters from one story to the next.' " In
addition, the court noted that Warner Brothers had not object-
ed to Hammett's use of the characters in three stories prior to
this suit and concluded that the parties had intended that
"Hammett should [not] be deprived of using the Falcon char-
acters in subsequently written stories, and that the contract,
properly construed, [did] not deprive Hammett of their
use."' 78 This determination was supported by Warner
Brothers' purchase price, which was inadequate to include the
rights to such popular literary characters. '
In its search for explicit statutory support, the court ex-
plained that although the practice of writing sequels was old
and the Copyright Act had been amended several times, the
Act had never specifically addressed this question; nor had the
question ever been adjudicated, although it was mentioned in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.'" Thus, the court deter-
mined that "[i]f Congress had intended that the "sale of the
right to publish a copyrighted story would foreclose the
author's use of its characters in subsequent works ... Con-
gress would have made specific provisions therefor."''
The court supplemented this position with a discussion of
the limitations of an author's imagination, commenting that
like an artist, an author's characters are "always limited
175. 216 F.2d at 949 (quoting Philipp v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 145 F.
Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1936)).
176. 216 F.2d at 949.
177. Id. The court cited earlier authors such as Edgar Allen Poe and Sir Ar-
thur Conan Doyle and current detective writers such as S. Van Dine and Erie
Stanley Gardner to support its position. Id.
178. Id. at 950.
179. Id. at 949.
180. Id. at 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
181. 216 F.2d at 950.
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and... fall into limited patterns."182 For this reason, the
court concluded that it would be unreasonable to restrict the
reuse of characters by their author and would in fact, be con-
trary to the Copyright Act's purpose to promote the arts."
In addition, the court decided that the characters were the
vehicle for the story and as such, did not go with the sale of
the story."s However, although the court determined here
that the characters were not copyrightable and that the author
was free to use them in subsequent stories, it did not foreclose
the possibility that characters could be copyrightable in the fu-
ture.8 5
2. Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc.
As established in Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad-
casting System," the court should first look to the language of
the contractual agreement to see if any express language as-
signed the rights to the entire body of source code to the
software publisher. Next, it should consider historical and/or
current custom in the industry, as well as the intent of the
parties at the time of the agreement. Finally, the court should
evaluate the concept of limited creativity.
In Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., ' for example,
the licensing agreement stated: "'Each licensed product shall
be delivered to Publisher in the form of a duplicatable pro-
gram (a "Master") on tape, diskette, and/or other specified
medium .... In addition to the Master, certain other materi-
als delivered concurrently shall be prepared by Developer.




185. Id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has found that characters are copyrightable
when. they "really constitute" the story and are not merely vehicles of the story.
See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). Another theo-
ry concerning the copyrightability of literary characters was put forth by Judge
Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
Judge Hand stated that "the less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indis-
tinctly." Il at 121. In other words, characters must be sufficiently delineated be-
fore copyright protection can attach.
186. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
187. Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) I
26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
188. Id. at 23,625-26 (quoting Defendant's Exhibit 7, at 8, Memorandum in
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ously discussed, Accolade interpreted the agreement as grant-
ing it the copyright to the source code in its entirety, while
DSI contended that the copyright protection did not include
the source code library routines"'
DSI argued that rather, the development agreement speci-
fied that the source code should be delivered in addition to the
developed and licensed product (The Duel), and therefore, the
copyright protected only the licensed product, which did not
include the source code."9 The district court agreed with
DSI's interpretation and denied Accolade's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction against the developer. 9' Although the
court did not feel that ownership of the copyright had been
fully briefed or argued for a final disposition, its reading of the
language of the licensing agreement at the time of its order
was that it did not transfer ownership of the underlying source
code to Accolade.'92
Next, the court should look to historical and/or current
custom in the industry to see whether the rights to portions of
the source code may be retained by the developer. In Accolade,
DSI claimed that it was the custom in the computer industry
for the developer to retain the rights to its library routines for
reuse in subsequent development efforts.' 3 To support its
claim, DSI provided the court with numerous declarations by
experts in the field of computer programming and software
development, affirming this tradition."
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Accolade, Inc. v. Dis-
tinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No.
90. 20202).
189. See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
190. Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1
26,612 at 23,626 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (emphasis in original).
191. Id. at 23,628.
192. Id. at 23,626-27.
193. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 2, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
194. 'It is an accepted fact in the industry that a developer could not contin-
ue in operation if it transferred its ability to use its developed library of standard
functional tools to a particular publisher for whom it was doing work." Declara-
tion of Emil Heidkamp in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 4, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
It is the custom and practice in our industry that when a copyright
in a computer game is conveyed to a publisher, the property rights
1992] 525
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In addition to industry practice, the court should consider
the intent of the parties at the time of the agreement, whether
the plaintiff has objected to any previous use of the source
code, and the price paid for the licensing agreement. In Acco-
lade, DSI claimed that it had always insisted on retaining the
rights to its library routines, offering a statement by the for-
mer president of Accolade that during negotiations:
Accolade initially insisted upon the transfer to Accolade of
all bytes to the entire source code for each computer game
developed by DSI for Accolade, [but] DSI vigorously resist-
ed that demand and it insisted that it retain ownership of
the source code. Accolade gave considerable thought to this
issue and decided to allow DSI to retain the source code."'
In addition, DSI claimed that Accolade consistently "acted
in a manner contrary to the notion that it owned the rights to
DSI's library routines."" For example, Accolade offered to
transferred are limited to the unique aspects of the computer game
as expressed in the video display and all rights to the library of ge-
neric or functional tools remain with the developer for use in future
computer game development projects.
Declaration of Donald Mattrick in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 2-3, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
"[I]t is universally understood within the entertainment software publishing
business that this library of basic, low level code or functional subroutines can
and will be reused by the developers in performing subsequent development con-
tracts with other publishers . . . ." Declaration of Robert Lindsey in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Soft-
ware, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
It is commonly understood by publishers working in the industry that
the well-established independent software developers they contract with
often have developed-and have used in the development of programs
for the various publishers they work for- -a library of common, often
repeated routines that are used as tools or building blocks in virtually
every specific game program they build.
Declaration of Don Daglow in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 3, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
195. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 4, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting Larkin Declaration 2, Defendant's Mem-
orandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Acco-
lade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202)) (emphasis in original). Tim Larkin, Accolade's former
president, supervised Accolade's negotiations for the licensing agreement with DSI.
Id.
196. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
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buy DSI's library routines, but DSI refused and instead, pro-
vided technical support to help Accolade develop its own li-
brary of subroutines. Furthermore, Accolade paid DSI for the
development of many additional products, even though DSI
had never delivered the source code for the library routines,
indicating that Accolade considered DSI's work to be complete
without delivery of that source code.9 7 Finally, as in Warner
Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, DSI claimed that
Accolade was aware that DSI had used the library routines in
its development for third parties and, until this suit, had been
indifferent to that use. In fact, even upon actual notice of the
use, Accolade had never previously claimed copyright in-
fringement.'
Finally, the concept of limited creativity, set forth in
Warner Bros., has application to software development. As pre-
viously discussed, a software developer generally spends a great
deal of time determining the most effective means to achieve a
specific result." Under such exhaustive circumstances, the
developer who has determined the most efficient configuration
of source code does not want to repeat the extensive develop-
ment cycle for each new contract. Indeed, an argument can
well be made that a software developer, like a literary author,
is an artist with a finite number of ideas.
A software developer could implement this argument of
limited creative possibilities in support of copyright protection
of source code. In a situation such as Warner Bros. or Accolade,
when a conflict arises after the parties have signed the con-
tract, the software developer could argue that there are only a
limited number of ways to write the source code for the same
subroutines. Because they "fall into limited patterns,"' the
developer should be able to retain the rights to the library
routines to be protected by a separate copyright or as a trade
secret. However, the ownership of the delivered product, de-
veloped especially to meet the unique needs of each individual
nary Injunction at 12, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
197. Id. at 12-13.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
200. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
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publisher, should belong to that software publisher."' This
argument is similar to the merger doctrine, where an idea and
expression merge,' but here, the limitations are of a creative
nature and do not preclude copyright protection of the un-
derlying source code.
B. Copyright Protection
If a developer decides to use copyright to protect the
rights to source code library routines, the first step is to reg-
ister the source code with the Copyright Office at the time the
library routines are developed. Indeed, the developer might
prefer copyright rather than trade secret as a means of protec-
tion, because it could provide a stronger defense against future
publishers' claims of copyright infringement.'5
In order for a work of authorship to be copyrightable, it
must be original to that author and meet a very minimal stan-
dard of creativity.' Accordingly, once an original work is
created, "[c]opyright protection subsists ... in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. " '
Although passage of the 1976 Copyright Act made registration
with the Copyright Office optional,' because registration is
prima facie evidence of ownership of a valid copyright and a
prerequisite for filing any suit for infringement, it is an option
most would favor when choosing copyright protection. 7
201. See Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1
26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216
F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
202. "When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circum-
stances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of
the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law." Herbert Rosenthal Jew-
elry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (1971). See Bibbero Sys. v. Colwell Sys.,
1988 Copyright L Dec. (CCH) 26,270 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Ufe Ins. Co.,
140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
203. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). It is very rare that works do not meet the
requisite minimum level of creativity for copyright protection. For cases in which
the court found lack of creativity, see John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows
Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986); Magic Mktg. v. Mailing Servs. of Pitts-
burgh, 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
206. Id. § 408(a).
207. Id. § 411(a).
528 [Vol. 32
SOURCE CODE
With these options in mind, the prudent software develop-
er would want to register the source code that performs basic
library functions with the Copyright Office prior to entering
into any development agreements with a software publisher. In
this way, the developer would protect the rights to these sub-
routines for reuse as needed in future development agree-
ments, as well as protect against the tedious, time-consuming
task of creating new solutions to the same problem for each
new development agreement.
In Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., for example,
DSI developed its library of subroutines long before entering
into a development agreement with Accolade.' In fact,
much of the code was developed by an individual prior to join-
ing DSI. Certainly, when the code has been developed over
a period of time and used in multiple development
agreements, the resulting library routines are more likely the
property of the developer, rather than the publisher. Indeed,
DSI asserted that it owned prior copyrights to the underlying
source code."'
1. Economic Support
As discussed earlier, copyright protection is the most pru-
dent means to protect the rights to previously developed
source code, a proposition that is supported by Whelan Associ-
ates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory."' Although the conflict in
Whelan was dissimilar to a software developer/publisher rela-
tionship, the court's emphasis on the amount of work neces-
sary to develop a software program has application to all types,
208. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 3-4, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202).
209. Id. When Rick Friesen joined DSI as Director of Research and Develop-
ment, he brought his library of subroutines to be used by DSI in its development
efforts. Id.
210. Declaration of Richard Friesen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request for
Preliminary Injunction, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-20202). Because of the integration
clause in the licensing agreement, the court did not consider this information
when determining ownership of the underlying source code. Accolade, Inc. v. Dis-
tinctive Software, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,612 at 23,627 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
211. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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of software development. 2 Although the court found that
the "coding process [was] a comparatively small part of pro-
gramming," its discussion of the effort and expense needed
prior to final coding supports any economic argument made
by a developer for copyright protection of source code.1
In describing the development process, the court noted
that first the programmer must identify the problem and out-
line a solution in terms of software modules or subrou-
tines.2 " Next, the programmer arranges the subroutines to
maximize the efficiency of the program, a critical factor in the
development of a useful program. s Only when the detailed
design of the program is complete does the programmer begin
the actual coding.2 6 Thus, the Whelan court is correct in stat-
ing that "[b]y far the larger portion of the expense and difficul-
ty in creating computer programs is attributable to the devel-
opment of the structure and logic of the program, and to de-
bugging, documentation and maintenance, rather than to the
coding."121
It is also correct to assume that once a developer has ex-
pended the extensive time and effort needed before writing
the source code, there is a strong economic incentive to retain
the exclusive rights to that code, even though the actual writ-
ing is not particularly demanding. Once the most efficient
manner of accomplishing the desired result is developed, the
developer has a vested interest in protecting it against any
infringing uses. Using copyright, the developer is able to pro-
tect against any conflict of interest in subsequent development
contracts and the necessity of creating new source code to
satisfy identical functional requirements. Indeed, it is this very
premise that formed the backdrop for the court's decision in
Whelan."8
212. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
213. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d at 1231.
214: Id. at 1229-30.
215. Id. at 1230.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1231.
218. Id. Note that the decision in Whelan concerned the copyrightability of
nonliteral elements, of the computer program, while the issue here concerns only
the literal elements of the developer's source code. Nevertheless, the discussion of
the creative process has application to the copyrightability of both literal and
nonliteral elements of computer programs.
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2. Legislative and Judicial Support
In addition, the Constitution and Congress bring strong
economic support to the argument for separate copyright pro-
tection of computer source code subroutines. As previously
discussed, the copyright statutes are based on Article I of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." " 9 Certainly the promotion
of the useful arts entails economic considerations and incen-
tives, a position that has found favor with the legislature over
the years.
In the legislative report on the 1909 Copyright Act, for
example, Congress discussed the need to balance the benefit
to the public, with the benefit to the author.' More recently,
Congress has recognized that "[a]lthough the primary purpose
of the copyright law is to foster the creation and dissemination
of intellectual works for the public welfare, it also has an im-
portant secondary purpose: To give authors the reward due
them for their contribution to society. "221
The legislative intent that the authors of copyrighted
works reap economic benefit has found complementary sup-
port with the judiciary. In Mazer v. Stein,' for example, the
Supreme Court discussed the economic philosophy behind the
constitutional grant as the "conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare."'
Thus, the software developer, whose concerns are eco-
nomic viability and potential growth, can find strong support
from many sources for the proposition that it should not be
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See supra notes 24-62 and accompanying
teXt.
220. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909),
221. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 5 (1961).
222. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
223. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 219 (1954). This sentiment was echoed in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), in which
the Court stated that the limited monopoly of copyright protection was intended
to "motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special re-
ward." Id. at 429.
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necessary to recreate library routines each time the developer
enters into a new agreement with a software publisher. Indeed,
the developer finds support across the spectrum of legal au-
thority: from the legislature, the judiciary, and historically,
from the Constitution. Furthermore, because of the complexity
of the development process, the software developer can argue
that the library routines must be afforded copyright protection
because of the economic hardship the developer will face due
to the prohibitive expense required to "reinvent the wheel" for
each new development project. 4
C. Trade Secret and Patent Protection
In addition to the federal statutes, the developer can turn
to state law or common law for trade secret protection. 5 To
receive trade secret protection, the developer must maintain
the confidentiality as to the way in which the source code is
written, and in return, the courts will protect against the mis-
appropriation of that code."6 Obvious problems can arise,
however, with regard to maintaining the secret, both
intra-organizationally and particularly when the developed
product has wide distribution."' Therefore, trade secret pro-
tection is more valuable during product development, where
224. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 13-14, Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc., No. 90-20202
(N.D. Cal. 1990). Note that the developer can also use the antitrust statutes to
supplement the economic argument for copyright protection. For example, if a
developer were required to develop new source code to perform the most basic
subroutines for each software publisher, the result would be that the developer
would have to deal exclusively with that particular publisher. This restriction is a
form of vertical restraint and a violation of the Sherman Act as an illegal restraint
of trade. A full discussion of antitrust application to software protection, however,
is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (1991).
225. A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of informa-
tion which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." LEAFFER, supra
note 1, at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)). Copyright
protection does not preempt the use of trade secret protection, but wide distribu-
tion of computer programs can make trade secret protection a less successful op-
tion. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 164.
226. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 163-64. Note that trade secret does not
protect against discovery through an innocent means, such as reverse engineering.
LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 72. See also Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975).
227. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 164.
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secrecy can more effectively be preserved." Although trade
secret has traditionally been used to protect computer pro-
grams,' copyright protection is the most prudent and effec-
tive course of action for the protection of widely-distributed
source code.
Occasionally patents have been used to protect software
programs,' but because the process is very expensive and
time consuming, it does not have application to so specialized
and rapidly evolving a need as the protection of source
code."' The examination process can take many years and
cost thousands of dollars, even when an application is finally
denied because it does not meet the stringent test of patent-
ability. =' Furthermore, the subject matter of source code
does not lend itself to patent protection, which protects "any
new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter."' s Patent protection has better application for a
product with an anticipated long market life, as well as a signif-
icant commercial value.2 u
Thus, because of the inherent shortcomings in other intel-
lectual property protection, copyright is best suited to the pro-
tection of source code. With the implementation of the follow-
ing proposal, copyright will provide even stronger protection
for the software developer in the future, as the rights to the
source code will only be transferrable upon the express grant
of the developer.
V. PROPOSAL
The software developer should be able to retain the rights
to source code that performs generic library subroutines. Not
only is this position economically sound, but it reflects the
tenets of the Constitution and the intent of the legislature as
well.
228. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 72.
229. Id.
230. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), establishing the patentability
of computer software.
231. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 163.
232. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 73.
233. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
234. LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 73.
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A. Copyright Protection of Source Code
The most effective way for a developer to protect the
rights to the source code is to register the source code prompt-
ly with the Copyright Office at the time it is developed. In that
way the source code will be protected against conflicting claims
of ownership in both current and future licensing agreements.
When the software developer enters into a development agree-
ment with a software publisher, there will be no confusion as
to the ownership of the underlying library routines: the devel-
oper owns the rights to the source code that performs the
generic subroutines, and has prima facie proof of this owner-
ship,"' and the publisher owns the source code that has been
developed specifically for that contract.
1. Statutory Support for Copyright Protection
Should a conflict arise as to the ownership of the source
code, the courts should look to the copyright statutes to inter-
pret any development agreement." Specifically, section
201(d) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides for the transfer of
ownership and the exclusive rights therewith and is supported
by section 204(a), which stipulates that the transfer is not valid
unless it is in writing and signed by the author, or authorized
agent."7
In addition, section 201(e) protects the author against
involuntary transfer of rights," which according to the legis-
lature "reaffirm[s] the basic principle that the United States
copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that au-
thor, and cannot be taken away by any involuntary
transfer."39 These sections protect the developer's rights to
235. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
236. Obviously the court should first look to the language of the development
agreement to establish ownership. If the agreement expressly delivers the rights to
all the source code to the software publisher, the publisher will probably prevail,
barring fraud or coercion. (As previously discussed, it is very unlikely that a
software developer would agree to such an arrangement, because of the economic
hardship. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.) Therefore, when the lan-
guage of the agreement is ambiguous or silent as to the ownership of the source
code, the court should look to copyright law for assistance in interpreting the
agreement.
237. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204(a) (1988).
238. Id. § 201(e).
239. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976
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source code library routines unless very specific requirements
are satisfied by the contracting parties: Unless express lan-
guage exists that explicitly transfers the rights to the entire
software package to the software publisher, copyright of the
underlying source code should take precedence, with the de-
veloper retaining ownership of the source code.
2. Judicial Support for Copyright Protection
The-judiciary has repeatedly interpreted the transfer of
ownership rights to mean that the rights must be expressly
granted to the licensee or assignee.24 To date, this position
has had little application in the area of software development,
but is one that the courts should consistently adopt when de-
termining ownership of source code that performs generic
library routines. Thus, as in Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software,
Inc.,"' if the development agreement does not expressly
transfer the rights to all the source code, pursuant to statute
and precedent, the rights to the generic subroutines should be
retained by the developer.
This interpretation of the ownership to source code is
consistent with constitutional provisions and makes solid eco-
nomic sense, as well. Competition is fierce in as rapidly evolv-
ing an industry as software development, and an entrepreneur
needs the incentive of monetary reward before investing the
time and resources necessary to develop complex source code.
If the developer must contend with the potential loss of this
effort every time a new development agreement is signed,
there will be little incentive to stay in business, and the subse-
quent benefits to society will never be realized.
3. Legislative Support for Copyright Protection
Although the courts should find sufficient support for this
position in the existing statutes, a better option is for the legis-
lature to amend the 1976 Copyright Act, specifically section
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739.
240. See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir 1988);
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
826 (1968); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
241. Copyright L Dec. (CCH) 26,612 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See supra notes
186-92 and accompanying text.
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201(d), concerning the transfer of ownership. Courts have
interpreted this section fairly consistently to mean that the
rights must be explicitly granted in the transfer agreement, but
the statute only specifies that "[t]he ownership of a copyright
may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of con-
veyance or by operation of law."2 12 Certainly this vague lan-
guage leaves room for judicial interpretation.
The addition of language that clearly states that any
change in ownership must be expressly granted in the agree-
ment for the transfer of rights to occur would narrow interpre-
tation. Thus, the proposed amendment would read:
(d) TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP. (1) The ownership
of copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by the
express grant of rights in any means of conveyance or by
operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession. (2) Any of the exclusive rights specified by
section 106,"" may be transferred as provided by clause
(1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular
exclusive right is entitled, tp the extent of that right, to all
of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright
owner by this title.
The addition of these few simple words would make it clear to
all concerned that the language in an agreement must express-
ly grant the transfer of property rights or those rights are re-
tained by the original owner. 4
B. Custom in the Software Industry
Finally, the courts should always consider the custom in
the software industry for additional support in determining
ownership rights to source code. When the developer retains
the rights to the generic subroutines and the publisher retains
242. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1988).
243. Section 106 concerns the exclusive rights in copyrighted works. Id § 106.
See supra note 16.
244. Given the history of copyright in the United States and the difficulty in
securing any amendment, it is unlikely that Congress will amend the 1976 Copy-
right Act to incorporate so narrow a proposal. However, this proposal would re-
solve the confusion as to the ownership of source code in the software industry
and in turn, would be an economic benefit to society as a whole. This proposal
would also impact other artistic areas, such as motion pictures, screenplays, music
and literature, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
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the rights to the product-unique software, as is the custom,
both can continue to function as viable economic entities. In
turn, society as a whole benefits from technological advances
through a wide range of ideas, designs, and systems, developed
and produced in the most economical manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has addressed the real need for copyright
protection of source code. As background for this discussion,
the history of copyright law was outlined, with particular em-
phasis on its application to the computer and computer soft-
ware. In addition, a number of landmark decisions were dis-
cussed, tracing the growth of copyright protection for comput-
er technology. Finally, the comment analyzed the problem of
shared rights to computer source code from the vantage point
of the software developer and suggested a solution through
copyright protection that is practical in today's expanding com-
puter marketplace.
As computer technology continues to advance, it becomes
increasingly important that the courts and legislature provide
adequate protection for software innovations. Key to this effort
is the software developer and the protection of the developer's
rights to development tools. Currently, the software developer
has the option to retain the rights to underlying library rou-
tines through copyright or trade secret protection. Although
copyright offers the most consistently reliable form of protec-
tion, whichever method of intellectual property protection is
selected, the developer must be able to retain the rights to this
source code for reuse in subsequent development efforts.
To rule that the software publisher retains the rights to an
entire software package would impact software development in
the competitive market both in the United States and abroad.
Additionally, it would defeat the primary purpose of the Con-
stitution, to benefit society, as well as contradict subsequent
intellectual property statutes. Clearly, it makes solid economic
and legal sense for the software developer to retain the rights
to the source code that performs generic subroutines: not only
is the benefit passed on to the publisher and the user in the
form of product variety, efficiency and price, but it serves as a
powerful economic incentive to the developer to continue ex-
ploration of new technological innovations. If the United
SOURCE CODE 53719921
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States is to maintain a presence in the rapidly changing, criti-
cally important world of computer technology, the legal com-
munity must support this proposal and consistently interpret
the laws to protect the advancement of software development.
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